Sobran's -- 
The Real News of the Month

December 1999
Volume 6, No. 12

Editor: Joe Sobran
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The columns on pages 7-12 are reprinted with permission of the 
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(pages 1-2)

Al Gore, Tennessee farmer and drawling son of the soil, has 
hired a fast-talking Jewish feminist, Naomi Wolf, to help 
hisself project a more manly presence. Her job is to make him 
come across as an "Alpha male," a leader of the pack, rather 
than a mere Clinton flunkey. She has written on the need to 
teach teenagers about masturbation and oral sex, but let's 
hope she doesn't rush Al into anything he's not ready for.

*          *          *

	Not long ago Gore let slip that he was donating 
about $300 a year to charity, apparently on the theory that a 
selfless public servant like hisself has already given enough 
at the office. He hired Miss Wolf at $15,000 per *month.*

*          *          *

	Gore is doing the last thing any candidate should 
do: making himself a joke among journalists. He has always 
been a hypocrite, as witness his flipflop on abortion when he 
decided to seek the presidency; now his hypocrisy gets 

*          *          *

	If elected, I promise to restore dignity to the vice 
presidency. And I'll have no qualms about accepting Howard 
Phillips as my Alpha male.

*          *          *

	The obsessive attacks on Pat Buchanan continue. The 
Weekly Standard has accused him of "calumny" for saying that 
columnist William Safire, a former White House colleague, "has 
always put Israel a little bit ahead of this country." That's 
understatement, not calumny; and anyway, Safire had accused 
Buchanan of anti-Semitism. Zionists resent any usurpation of 
their right to practice unanswered character assassination.

*          *          *

	Meanwhile, on the day Buchanan was to announce he 
was leaving the Republican Party to join the Reform Party, the 
Wall Street Journal devoted almost its whole editorial page to 
a hatchet job on him by Norman Podhoretz. Picking through the 
files, Podhoretz found a handful of Familiar Quotations that 
might, if malevolently construed, be called anti-Semitic 
(assuming that criticism of Israel qualifies).

*          *          *

	Podhoretz accused Buchanan, with his slogan "America 
First," of reviving "the old canard of 'dual loyalty.'" 
Canard? What is the pro-Israel lobby in business for, if not 
to seek the welfare of Israel at the expense of the United 
States? It's no good pretending the two countries' interests 
are identical; that would be impossible. In all the years I've 
been reading such Zionist publications as Commentary, the 
magazine Podhoretz used to edit, I have never come across an 
article asking whether what was good for Israel might 
sometimes be costly to the United States. But I have read 
several hate-crazed articles blaming the Holocaust on 

*          *          *

	A few days later, the Journal featured an article 
that made Buchanan's point: the Zionist writer Joshua 
Muravchik called for the United States to support the 
overthrow of Israel's enemy, Saddam Hussein. In America's 
interest, of course.

*          *          *

	The hate campaign against Buchanan is curiously 
devoid of real nouns and verbs. His accusers don't say 
Buchanan has done, or *would* do, or has even threatened to 
do, anything specifically harmful to Jews; only that he "is," 
in some undefined way, anti-Semitic. Evidently you're now an 
anti-Semite not if you hate Jews, but if they hate you.

*          *          *

	The lesson? It's hazardous even to *identify* Jewish 
interests for the purpose of judging them by Christian 
interests. The differences between Jewish and Christian 
culture are profound; but only Jews may take them seriously. 
Even in this era of multiculturalism, Christians must pretend 
those cultural differences don't exist and babble happily 
about "the Judaeo-Christian tradition," which Jews aren't 
silly enough to believe in.

*          *          *

	Charges of "anti-Semitism," like those of "racism," 
"sexism," and (my favorite among these hothouse pseudo-words) 
"homophobia," exploit the weakening of libel laws (since a 
1964 Supreme Court ukase). They are synthetic adjectives that 
lack definition and specificity; they therefore can't be 
disproved, and there is no penalty for making them out of 
sheer spite. All they really tell you is that their target is 
the object of hatred for opposing a victimhood 

*          *          *

	And again, the attacks on Buchanan (and Pius XII) 
continue to avoid any mention of the tens of millions of 
Christians who were enslaved and persecuted when the Soviet 
Union, with American assistance, won World War II. The liberal 
view -- shared by many who think of themselves as 
conservatives -- is that the United States won because Hitler 
lost. You wonder whether these folks have ever looked at a 

*          *          *

	One result of Hitler's defeat is that it's 
impossible to discuss ethnic issues frankly in public. If 
Euclid had lost a war, geometry would probably be taboo.

*          *          *

	Has everyone forgotten the great Cardinal Joseph 
Mindszenty? In 1949 he was charged with trying to overthrow 
the Communist regime of Hungary and, refusing to confess, was 
imprisoned for 23 years. The phony evidence -- forged letters, 
full of spelling errors -- was exposed by the two remorseful 
forgers themselves, a married couple who fled to Paris with 
microfilms exposing the truth (where the husband died suddenly 
and mysteriously -- murdered, his wife insisted unavailingly). 
But this famous case has gone down the Memory Hole, along with 
other stories of Red persecution of Christians. (For more 
information, write to the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation, P.O. 
Box 11321, St. Louis, Missouri 63105-0121.)

*          *          *

	Flash! Liberals have discovered the Tenth Amendment. 
They find it useful when the state governments, especially the 
courts, get more progressive than the Republican Congress. 
Representative John Conyers, a Detroit Bolshevik and noted 
Clinton defender, opposes a bill to outlaw assisted suicide as 
recently legalized in Oregon. The Tenth Amendment, he reminds 
his colleagues, "has reserved to the states those rights" -- 
it actually says "powers," but let's not quibble -- "not given 
to the federal government." And of course Conyers and his ilk 
(and a revolting ilk it is!) have no intention of applying the 
federal principle except when it serves their pet evil causes. 
But what the heck. Why shouldn't the Democrats claim the Tenth 
Amendment? The Republicans aren't using it.

Defender of the Faith
(pages 3-6)

[Breaker: A new defense of the status quo]
[Breaker: Government: "necessary evil" or "necessary 
[Breaker: The states, Wills says, aren't, and never 
were, "sovereign."]
[Breaker: Wills studiously avoids the language of the 

By one scholar's reckoning, governments in the twentieth 
century have murdered 200 million people. This is exclusive of 
wars, in which other tens of millions have perished.

	Divide these numbers by 20, and you still might 
reasonably wonder why there has been no mass revolt against 
the modern state. On the contrary, most people still regard 
the state as a legitimate and even beneficent institution, 
meekly obeying it and actually wishing to enlarge its powers. 
The Founders of the United States, who prided themselves on 
learning from experience, would be aghast at our 

	But for Garry Wills, author of A Necessary Evil: A 
History of American Distrust of Government (Simon & Schuster), 
the question is why so much "anti-government" sentiment 
persists. He thinks the people who have taken lessons from 
this bloodiest of centuries are so peculiar as to need 365 
pages of explaining. Think of it: even after the experience of 
Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Idi Amin, some folks *still* 
don't trust their rulers! When will they ever learn?

	Wills, a journalist and historian, has emerged as a 
bold reinterpreter of the American political tradition. His 
acclaimed books on Jefferson, Madison, Washington, and Lincoln 
challenge the received wisdom on these towering figures, 
arguing that the authentic American tradition is closer to the 
liberal left than usually believed.

	Apart from being a fixture of the American 
intellectual elite, Wills is the rare leftist who knows and 
tries to answer conservative arguments. Unfortunately, he has 
a bad habit of misstating them.

	In Inventing America (1978) Wills argued that 
Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of Independence was 
shaped by the Scottish Enlightenment, rather than (as 
generally assumed) by John Locke. The ideology of the 
Declaration, he insisted, was therefore less Lockean -- that 
is, less individualistic -- and more "communitarian" than 
anyone had realized.

	The liberal press welcomed this thesis, but a number 
of scholars pointed out that Wills took liberties with the 
evidence: Jefferson had cited Locke as the greatest of 
political theorists and even copied his wording in the 
Declaration. Wills's book was an attempt to reclaim Jefferson 
from the tradition of individualism and limited government.

	Similarly, Wills's 1992 Pulitzer-winning book, 
Lincoln at Gettysburg, contended that the Gettysburg Address, 
by way of "a giant (if benign) swindle" and rhetorical 
"sleight of hand," had "remade America," giving Americans a 
whole new understanding of their political tradition. 
Lincoln's new principle may have been ahistorical, but it had, 
in Wills's view, improved on the original by virtually 
demolishing the hoary notion of states' rights (and limited 
federal government). Thanks to Lincoln (if not Jefferson), we 
are a "nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are 
created equal," in a sense the Founders would have rejected.

	So Lincoln himself, in Wills's account, becomes our 
last (and greatest) Founding Father. The Gettysburg Address, 
Wills held, has even changed the way we understand the 
Declaration of Independence. He's right about that: Lincoln 
conspicuously omitted "the consent of the governed," the 
principle the South was fighting for.

	Wills is nothing if not ambitious. But is he 
reliable? In A Necessary Evil, he tries to show that the 
traditional American suspicion of government is based on a 
faulty set of "anti-government values" and "anti-government 
attitudes." According to Wills, these atavistic values and 
attitudes link a host of reactionary forces: anti-Federalist 
opponents of the Constitution, Southern secessionists, various 
rebels and vigilantes, gun-control resisters, and the anti-
abortion movement, along with numerous individuals, from 
Calhoun and Thoreau to Mencken and Albert Jay Nock, along with 
recent oddballs like David Koresh and Timothy McVeigh. Even 
Jefferson and Madison have made their contributions to this 
baneful tradition, which regards government as no more than "a 
necessary evil." Wills sees the tradition culminating in 
Ronald Reagan, whom he despises.

	Wills argues that government is actually "a 
necessary good," an institution that fosters "social 
affections" and the good life. Its rules may diminish certain 
idealized primitive freedoms, but they produce the more 
essentially human freedoms of civilized society. He scorns the 
pseudo-Lockean notion that man was born free in the state of 
nature but surrendered his original liberty for the security 
of the social contract; in his view, society is an exchange of 
a lower kind of freedom (the absence of physical restraint) 
for a higher one (the harmony of cooperation). It follows that 
we should be grateful for government, not resentful or 

	Because Wills is an able and learned polemicist, A 
Necessary Evil is probably the best defense of the status quo 
we are likely to see; the status quo being a centralized 
government of enormous dimensions that reinterprets the 
Constitution to suit itself, ignoring essential limitations on 
its powers.

	But A Necessary Evil is fatally flawed by Wills's 
failure to define his two key terms, "government" and "anti-
government." By reducing so many streams of thought to these 
crude categories, Wills implies that there are ultimately only 
two alternatives, ruling out the distinctively American idea 
of limited federal government. Wills is really writing about 
the long controversy between "centralizers" and "anti-
centralizers," lumping all the latter together with 
anarchists, radical individualists, eccentrics, and cranks.

	As one of his villainous examples, Wills cites 
Jefferson Davis. But Davis -- a U.S. senator, secretary of war 
(under Franklin Pierce), and president of the Confederate 
States of America -- can hardly be described as "anti-
government." He wanted the state governments to have more 
power than the federal government. His ideal distribution of 
power was by no means anarchic; it presupposed more power in 
the state -- including the power to authorize and sustain 
slavery -- than Wills himself would probably favor.

	Wills likewise misrepresents the debate over the 
ratification of the Constitution. Against all evidence, he 
contends, with Lincoln, that the states were never truly 
"sovereign" -- never mind that they consistently claimed to be 
sovereign, and just as consistently recognized each other as 
such. If Wills is right, Lincoln's great "swindle" would have 
been unnecessary; the true American tradition would have been 
just what Lincoln said it was -- an original Union from which 
no state could withdraw.

	In making his case, Wills is forced to falsify the 
facts. He admits that the Articles of Confederation said that 
"each state retains its sovereignty," but he deprives the 
provision of its full force by omitting the rest of the 

	"Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which 
is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United 
States, in Congress assembled." The word "retains" clearly 
implies that sovereignty was a property the states "already" 
possessed -- and mutually acknowledged. But Wills treats state 
sovereignty as a mere legal fiction, and an empty one at that.

	You wouldn't know it by reading Wills, but the 
sentence just quoted begins the Articles of Confederation and 
states the premise of the whole document. Wills likewise 
scants the Declaration's climactic claim "that these United 
Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, Free and Independent 
States" -- not, as Lincoln had it, "a [single] new nation," 
but in the words of Willmoore Kendall, "a baker's dozen of new 

	The states were jealous of their sovereignty. When 
the Revolution ended, Great Britain recognized the states, 
naming each one separately, as "free, sovereign, and 
independent states" -- another passage Wills fails to quote. 
When the Constitution was adopted, three states ratified on 
the express reservation of their right to "resume" or 
"reassume" the powers "delegated" to the federal government -- 
that is, the right to secede. Wills, of course, doesn't quote 
these clauses either. He doesn't even quote the Tenth 
Amendment, which reaffirms the principle of state sovereignty.

	One of his chief purposes is to discredit the right 
of secession, which rests on the principle that the states are 
sovereign and may reclaim the powers they have delegated. But 
even if the states' right to secede (and resist by arms) is 
denied, we still have to ask how, then, the states are 
supposed to protect themselves against violations of their 
reserved powers.

	Wills forgets that a "state" was, in the eighteenth 
century, sovereign by definition. A "confederation" was -- 
likewise by definition -- a voluntary association of sovereign 
states, any of which might withdraw at any time. Today, thanks 
to the linguistic decay that accompanies political corruption, 
a "state" means a mere subdivision of the central government, 
while "federal" has become a synonym for its former antonym, 

	The United States, under the Articles, was "a firm 
league of friendship," nothing more -- certainly not a supreme 
sovereign power *over* the states. Even The Federalist Papers 
often refer to the Union under the proposed Constitution as 
"the Confederacy." They never deny the ultimate right of 
secession; if they had, the anti-Federalists would have leaped 
on the denial as proof that ratification was a trap from which 
there was no escape.

	Not that Wills grasps any of this. Nor does he seem 
to understand that the word "delegate" can only mean that the 
entity granting power (the individual state, by ratifying the 
Constitution) is superior to the recipient (the Union), and 
that any delegation of power is necessarily limited. To 
delegate unlimited power would amount to abdication, rendering 
the delegator inferior to the delegatee.

	It gets worse. Wills further neglects to quote 
Madison's assurance (in Federalist No. 45) that federal powers 
are "few and defined," while those powers that "remain" 
(again, the word implies prior possession) with the states are 
"numerous and indefinite." Wills observes that Madison agreed 
that the states would enjoy a "residual" sovereignty, but here 
again his artful quotation misleads the unwary reader, making 
"residual" sound trivial. In fact, Madison's word is 
"residuary," so Wills misquotes the only word he cites (and 
omits mention of its source, Federalist No. 39).

	What Madison actually says is that "[federal] 
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and 
leaves to the several States a residuary and *inviolable* 
sovereignty over *all other objects*" [emphases mine] -- the 
Tenth Amendment principle. This is only one of many Federalist 
assurances that the Constitution not only wouldn't promote but 
would actually *preclude* "consolidated" government. Madison 
clearly admits that the polities contemplating ratification 
are "independent states," each of which is "a sovereign body 
independent of all others."

	Wills doesn't explain how the states could defend 
their reserved powers against "usurpation." The question 
doesn't interest him, because he favors what Madison's 
generation called "consolidated" government. But "usurpation," 
along with "consolidation," was a central concept of the 
ratification debate. The question was whether the United 
States was to be ruled by a single, centralized, 
"consolidated" government. The Federalists assured their 
opponents that it could never happen, because the states 
could, if necessary, mount armed resistance -- a live 
possibility in those pre-nuclear days, which helps to explain 
the Second Amendment. The point is that *both* sides professed 
to agree (with some hypocrisy on the Federalist side) that 
consolidation was an evil.

	Given Wills's scholarly pretensions (with hundreds 
of footnotes), it's remarkable that he takes pains to avoid 
using or quoting the terms in which the Founders debated. But 
there's a reason for his avoidance. To use the language of the 
Founders is to be drawn into a way of thinking about 
government that Wills is intent on ignoring, when he doesn't 
simply misrepresent it -- a habit of making distinctions 
between powers: proper and improper, constitutional and 
unconstitutional, delegated and reserved. For him, these 
nuances seem to be superfluous, because government power as 
such is a good thing -- "a necessary good" (though he would 
admit occasional exceptions).

	Wills rejoices that, thanks largely to Lincoln, the 
states have lost any effective means of resistance to federal 
usurpation, since such usurpation has given us, among other 
things, legal abortion. But he is never candid enough to say 
he favors *consolidated* government; he merely professes to 
favor "government" in the abstract, without definition or 
limits. Federalists and anti-Federalists debated passionately 
over the limits and proper powers of the federal government, 
and over how the states should be protected, or defend 
themselves, against federal tyranny. None of this interests 
Wills. For him, to favor *any* limits on "government" -- the 
federal government in particular -- is to be "anti-

	Continuing his assault on the obvious, Wills 
contends that the separation of powers was meant to enable the 
federal government to "*achieve* efficiency" (his emphasis), 
not to impede it. This ingenious notion forgets a central 
Federalist contention: that you can make a government 
efficient for certain purposes, while simultaneously 
installing strong limits and safeguards against its assumption 
of powers not granted to it.

	Moreover, Wills overlooks the many passages in which 
The Federalist Papers cite, as the patron saint of republican 
government, "the celebrated Montesquieu," who defined tyranny 
as the concentration of all powers -- legislative, executive, 
and judicial -- in one man, or one body of men. Time and again 
they repeat that these powers of government must be "separate 
and distinct," "divided and balanced," and so forth, in order 
to forestall "the encroaching spirit of power," the 
"assembling all power in the same hands," "those encroachments 
which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of 
government in the same hands," et cetera.

	In Federalist No. 40, Madison wrote that "the great 
principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may 
be considered less as absolutely new than as the expansion of 
principles which are found in the Articles of Confederation." 
He repeated this point in Federalist No. 45, assuring his 
readers that "the change which it [the Constitution] proposes 
consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, 
than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS" -- i.e., its 
powers under the Articles of Confederation. Truly 
constitutional government would look a lot less like today's 
mammoth warfare-welfare state, and a lot more like the United 
States under the Articles.

	Wills follows Lincoln in holding that "it takes all 
parties to the Constitution to rescind it." No, the usurpation 
of any state's powers by the federal government might dissolve 
the confederation between that state and the Union, just as 
any breach of contract releases the offended party. The 
seceding states never denied the right of other states to 
remain in the Union; Lincoln's charge that the seceders sought 
to "destroy the Union" was nonsense. One secession (or 20) 
would diminish the Union, but couldn't destroy it.

	The nonseceding state of Maryland recognized the 
right of its sister states to secede, so enraging Lincoln that 
he ordered the arrest of many Maryland legislators. So much 
for "government of the people, by the people, for the people." 
(Wills never mentions Lincoln's attempt to arrest Chief 
Justice Roger Taney, who had accused him of usurping 
Congress's powers.) "The majority of the people constitute a 
binding sovereignty," Wills writes; but Lincoln insisted that 
the Constitution, *not* the will of the majority, required him 
to crush secession.

	When dealing with later "anti-government" figures 
like H.L. Mencken and Albert Jay Nock, Wills doesn't bother 
with refutation. He doesn't so much as mention Nock's 
masterpiece, Our Enemy the State, in which the "anti-
government" Nock argues *for* common-law "government," against 
the modern "state," a system of pillage and murder. Far from 
being anti-social, as Wills suggests, Nock preferred "social 
power" to "state power." Instead of addressing both men's 
philosophies, Wills quotes their occasional unflattering 
remarks about women and minorities, as if these were 
sufficient to discredit them; never mind that both Mencken and 
Nock spoke far more harshly of the general population than of 
any minority.

	Madison (in Federalist No. 53) said the U.S. 
Constitution would be superior to the British constitution in 
one crucial respect. England's unwritten constitution could be 
changed, and fundamental liberties curtailed or abolished, by 
a simple legislative act of Parliament. But the United States 
would enjoy a Constitution "established by the people and 
unalterable by the government."

	Today, alas, the Constitution is constantly altered 
by the government, though our rulers naturally prefer not to 
put it quite that way: they say the Constitution is a "living 
document," implying that it somehow alters itself.

	As Wills stresses, Madison secretly *wanted* a 
consolidated government, armed with a "negative" (veto) over 
all legislative acts of the states, effectively reducing the 
states to the status of counties. Before the delegates met in 
Philadelphia, he told George Washington that such a complete 
power over the states was "absolutely necessary" to a new 
constitution. He and Alexander Hamilton were to be bitterly 
disappointed by the Constitution, but they decided to settle 
for it and became, ironically, its ablest advocates.

	Though Madison's veto was quickly shot down by the 
Philadelphia convention, Wills rightly observes that the 
federal judiciary has learned to use the Fourteenth Amendment 
to achieve the same effect, nullifying the states' reserved 
powers and virtually repealing the Tenth Amendment in the name 
of individual rights. If the states had retained their 
sovereignty, such judicial transgressions (foreseen by the 
anti-Federalists) would have been impossible. Any serious 
usurpation of the states' powers -- as in Roe v. Wade -- could 
have provoked secession. But for Wills usurpation is not a 
problem; it's a desideratum.

	In a curious twist on the idea of original intent, 
Wills treats Madison's private unfulfilled wish for 
consolidation as if it were more authoritative than the actual 
Constitution; and by his expansive logic, anyone who accepts 
Madison's public assurances (in The Federalist Papers) that 
the federal government *can't* and *shouldn't* be consolidated 
is "anti-government." Presumably Wills considers Madison one 
more Lincoln-like "benign swindler."

	Wills closes the book with an eloquent defense of 
human society itself. He argues that we need each other in 
order to realize ourselves, which would be impossible in a 
supposititious state of nature where every man would have to 
take full responsibility for his own survival and self-
defense. True enough, and Nock would agree. (So would Robinson 
Crusoe.) But he implies that "society" and the modern 
limitless state are the same thing, which is hardly the case. 
Rejecting life under Stalin doesn't mean yearning to dwell on 
a desert island.

	Intellectuals remain the great carriers of the 
stubborn twentieth-century faith in the state. A Necessary 
Evil may stand as a scholarly monument of cognitive 
dissonance: drawing from history the precise opposite of 
history's real lessons. If the Founders could see us now, they 
would probably repent that they'd provided far too few 
safeguards against the kind of state Garry Wills celebrates.

Boxed Copy

Farewell, your lordships: Under the prodding of Prime Minister 
Tony Blair, the British House of Lords has been virtually 
abolished, with the elimination of hereditary seats for the 
nobility. Such privilege is undemocratic, don't you see. So 
the Mother of Parliaments, celebrated by Montesquieu and 
others for its division of power, takes another step toward 
monolithic government. My friend Charles, Earl of Burford (a 
collateral descendant and champion of the Earl of Oxford, 
alias Shakespeare), has valiantly opposed the change -- so 
vehemently, in fact, that he was ejected from the House of 
Lords during a recent debate. As an opportunist, Blair himself 
has only one peer: his role model Bill Clinton. (page 8)

Boys will be boys: In an interview with ABC News, Bill Clinton 
admitted to a "personal mistake" with you-know-who, but said 
history will credit him with being "right to stand and fight 
for my country and my Constitution and its principles." Excuse 
me, but he was tried for perjury and obstruction, not 
adultery; has he forgotten that an Arkansas judge fined him 
$90,000 for lying under oath in her court? He fought for "my 
Constitution" in the same sense that Cosa Nostra fights for 
the Fifth Amendment -- except that Cosa Nostra doesn't 
actually subvert the document it invokes. (page 9)

Look! Up in the sky! It's Mr. Campaign Reform! The Washington 
Post reports: "Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) has traveled 
extensively for his presidential campaign this year on 
airplanes provided by several of the large corporations he 
helps regulate as chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee." 
(page 10)

The Rule of Law: In the wake of a federal judge's ruling that 
Microsoft is, seeks to be, or "could" become an illegal 
monopoly, the legal profession is drooling. Expect the sort of 
suits against Microsoft we're now seeing against tobacco 
companies. "We're looking at it, we're seriously looking at 
it," says Stanley Chesley (described by the Washington Post as 
"a prominent class-action tobacco lawyer"). "Millions of 
people bought Windows, and if the company overcharged 
consumers, it should be held responsible." Of course the 
biggest monopolist in America is the constitutionally lawless 
federal government, which uses its limitless taxing power in 
the exercise of countless usurped powers; how about a class-
action suit on behalf of taxpayers? (page 12)

Reprinted columns (pages 7-12)

* The Reagan Cult (October 7, 1999)
* We the Victors (October 14, 1999)
* Altering the Constitution (October 19, 1999)
* The State v. Christian Culture (October 21, 1999)
* Forbidden Unless Authorized (November 2, 1999)
* "Arbiters" of Abortion (November 4, 1999)

All articles are written by Joe Sobran

This publication is for private use only.
Copyright (c) 1999 by The Vere Company. All rights reserved.
Distributed with permission by the Griffin Internet Syndicate